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Venture Capital Investor Behaviour in the Backing of UK High 
Technology Firms: Financial Reporting and the Level of Investment 
 
1. Introduction 
The general purpose of this article is to examine the conduct of UK investors 
(Bushrod, 2002; Murray and Lott, 1995; Murray and Mariott, 1998), in their provision 
of finance capital (in venture capital or private equity form (Campbell, 2003; Robbie, 
1998)) to firms producing or developing high technology products.  Its specific focus 
is on the valuation of such companies (Brown and Cliff, 2005) and, in this process, 
the utilisation of financial reporting, risk reporting (Kothavala, 2003) and information 
on internally developed intangible assets (Brown and Cliff, 2005; Brynjolfsson et al., 
2002; Meuller and Supina, 2000), ultimately to determine the level of provision of 
funds to investees. 
   The key features of our approach involve: (a) the extraction and use of new primary 
source data (cf. Bailes et al., 1998; Wong, 2003 on use of survey data and investor 
sentiment) on UK investor behaviour; (b) the detailed exploration of investor attitudes 
(Ruchala, 1999) in terms of perceived utility of the structure of reporting (e.g. risk 
disclosure) in seeking to value high-technology firm (Eckstein et al., 1998); (c) 
explicit statistical analysis of factors which contribute to perceived superior investor 
conduct (e.g. financial accounts, location in science parks, control over investees’ 
AIS); and (d) the impact of investor attitudes (Barkham and Ward, 1999; Brown and 
Cliff, 2005; Fisher and Statman, 2000) on the level of private equity they are willing 
to provide to investors.   
   Whilst the approach is provisional, we believe it is of some novelty, and that it can 
lay the basis for a broader and more general adoption of our methodologies and 
techniques.  In turn, this academic development may have the potential for a positive 
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impact on the practitioner side.  Since events like the dot.com meltdown of 2000, 
when investors hung back from high-technology investments (Poynder, 2001), we 
have been more acutely aware of how a change in investor attitudes – what might be 
called ‘investor sentiment’ – can be to the detriment of commercialising products 
from the science base.  Behind such sentiment, as we shall aim to demonstrate, are 
quite specific (and malleable or controllable) features of AIS. In turn, these attitudes 
drive investment levels, as our econometric analysis demonstrates. 
   The academic points of departure for this paper are the extant literature on venture 
capital investing (e.g. Florou, 2005; Jelic et al., 2005; Khurshed, 2000; Robbie, 1998; 
Weber and Willenborg, 2003), financial and risk reporting (Ruchala, 1999), 
intellectual property (Eliasson and Wihlborg, 2003), intangible asset valuation 
(Garcia-Ayuso, 2003; Gelb and Siegel, 2000; Hand, 2002; Holland, 2001; Mueller, 
2004), and investment decision-making (see Schroeder and Gibson (1990) for analysis 
of comprehension of management discussion and analysis (MD&A), and Zacharakis 
and Meyer (2000), in an explicitly venture capital investment context).  These 
different strands of thought are combined in an inter-disciplinary way to create a new 
view on investment decisions and their predication on reporting protocols.  Of 
especial concern to us is the valuation of internally generated intangible assets, typical 
assets for high-technology firms, being protected through devices like patents (Hall et 
al., 2005), copyrights and brands, or simply through trade secrecy. 
   The methodology we adopt combines questionnaire analysis with statistical and 
econometric analysis.  Briefly, new primary source data were generated by a postal 
questionnaire (with call-back) to the UK’s most active investors in high-technology 
firms.  The data gathered concerned investment type and sector; utility of financial 
reporting; disclosure of risk (Kothavala, 2003); and management accounting and 
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performance (Engel et al., 2002; Florou, 2005; Jelic et al., 2005).  Statistical analysis 
is used to examine the utility of financial reporting in assessing company risk.  
Finally, econometric analysis involves estimating a multiple regression model which 
explains the level of investment in high-technology firms by investors’ attitudes.  The 
dimensions of the latter involve attitudes to: extent of disclosure (Maines et al., 2003); 
standardised risk reporting; and compulsory information provision (Schroeder and 
Gibson, 1990). 
   The paper develops its ideas in the following way.  It has three substantive sections: 
methodology, covering the sample and questionnaire; evidence, covering key features 
of the new data gathered; and statistical/ econometric evidence, covering correlation 
analysis and multiple regression analysis. 
   Briefly, our key findings are as follows: first, investors prefer to rely on their own 
procedures and processes, do not find financial reporting particularly useful, yet do 
not favour (for competitive reasons) greater provision of financial information. 
Second, investors’ attitudes do correlate with their overt practice, which may be 
summarised as being proactive, information intensive and risk-managing.  Third, 
investors’ attitudes to information provision and risk reporting have a significant (and 
measurable) impact on the volume of funds they will allocate. 
 
2. Methodology 
More broadly, our work provides insights into the problems that investors in high-
technology firms face, when using such firms’ financial accounts, prepared in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), especially as 
regards the valuation of intangible assets (Peneder, 2002) and goodwill (Canibano et 
al., 2000; Meuller and Supina, 2002; Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
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No.142).  Against this background, this section considers how the sampling frame of 
UK investors was constructed, how sampling was performed, and how the 
questionnaire was designed and administered. 
 
2.1 Sample 
A sampling frame was created by drawing upon two sources: first, the membership 
list of the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA); and second, the listing of UK 
investors provided by the Venture Capital Report (VCR).  Given the theme of our 
research, we screened for investors who had an expressed interest in backing high-
technology companies.  Using web site resources for these two organisations, a 
sample of 114 investors was identified who satisfied our criteria.  A response rate of 
27% was achieved, which is quite typical for postal surveys of this sort. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
   Figure 1 indicates the sectoral representation of the sample.  Investors were asked to 
identify their five most favoured high-technology sectors, out of a set of nineteen, and 
then to rank these five in order of preference (coded as 1 = low to 5 = high) (See 
Q.1.3 of Questionnaire, Appendix).  Using these scores, mean responses over the 
nineteen sectors were computed, as indicated in Figure 1.  Essentially, each bar height 
indicates the average desirability of investment involvement in a specific sector (e.g. 
biotechnology, software). Desirability scores can drop below an average of unity, as 
sectors which were not nominated had an assigned score of zero.  Taking unity as a 
threshold value, we see that seven sectors stand out as being most desirable, in terms 
of the perceptions of UK investors, namely: biotechnology, medical/ health related, 
communications, information technology hardware, software and computer services, 
internet technology, and electronics.  Of these, software and computer services was by 
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far the most preferred.  Some of the surprising ‘ugly sectors’ included chemicals and 
materials, industrial automation, and energy. Although patenting is traditionally high 
in these technologies, they may be perceived as older generation investment types, 
compared to the knowledge intensive products currently finding favour. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
  The preference of investors by stage of investment is indicated in Figure 2.  For 
high-technology contexts, investors were asked to rank their five most common stages 
of investment involvement (e.g. start-ups, MBO) (See Q.1.4 in Questionnaire, 
Appendix).  Coding of responses was 0 = irrelevant; 1 = low through to 5 = high).  It 
is of great interest that seed corn, start-up, early-stage, and expansion are by far the 
most common investment involvements.  UK ‘venture capital’ is legendary for 
favouring development capital opportunities, with a focus on company turnaround, 
MBO and MBI investment involvements.  These are, certainly, forms of private 
equity provision, but arguably, not properly classified as true business venturing.  
However, so far as high technology is concerned, the clear picture is that UK 
investors behave like true ‘adventurers’, and commonly go in at the high-risk end of 
equity provision, with early stage (other than seed corn and start-up) being the 
commonest type of investment involvement.  Of the remaining wide range of 
investment involvements, the MBO is the most common; but it is relatively 
unimportant compared to the broad range of early stage involvements that UK venture 
capitalists in high technology areas now favour. 
   Within the class of early stage investments, one does find a ranking of prevalence 
which corresponds to well known rankings of high risk investment propositions.
1
 
Thus seed corn backing is less common than other early stage, indicating a reverse 
ranking by risk exposure.  However, there does seem to be a de-coupling of risk 
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attitude when it comes to the remaining wide range of investment types by stage, 
ranging from mezzanine financing to replacement equity. The latter are all, more 
obviously, the domain of private equity investing and are much less prevalent 
investment forms when it comes to high technology backing.  In sum, investors are 
bullish about the prospects of high-technology firms and are bold in seeking high risk 
investment involvements, in their pursuit of high investment returns.  Within this 
broad category of investment (viz. high-technology) this represents a welcome change 
of UK investor sentiment, in contrast to the aversion to the ‘bleeding-edge’ of 
technology so fearfully stylised ten to fifteen years ago. 
[Figure 3 near here] 
   Finally, Figure 3 reports on UK investors’ preferences by market extent.  The data 
were generated by a question asking investors what geographical preference they had, 
when deciding whether or not to make an investment.  Five options were allowed, 
ranging from local to worldwide (See Q.1.1 in Questionnaire, Appendix).  In effect, 
these options comprise a nesting of the desired extent of the market for the dispensing 
of investible funds.  Thus the pie-chart denotes preference for market extent, rather 
than allocation of funds by regions.  Surprisingly, the preferences of UK investors 
over market extent are quite diverse.  In particular, proximity does not appear to play 
as large a role as one might suspect, with preferences, on balance (52.6%), being for 
investments beyond the local or regional area.  As contrasted with US experience, 
where proximity does seem to be important, UK investors appear to be willing to go 
to wherever the deal is favourable.  This is not just because the UK is geographically 
small, as over one quarter of investors (27.4%) have preferences for investing 
internationally (either in Europe, or in the rest of the world). 
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2.2 Questionnaire 
The investors of our sampling frame, as described above, were approached directly 
(using addresses from the VCR) by post, using a pre-letter (explaining the scope and 
purpose of the study) and a hard copy of an eight-page questionnaire (see Appendix).  
Briefly, this questionnaire investigated: the general background of investors (e.g. 
desired investee location, sector, stage, type); ways of assessing, managing and 
accounting for intangible assets in high technology companies; and investor influence 
on investees’ internal management and reporting. Most questions were qualitative in 
purposes, and measured importance, extent of agreement, significance etc from an 
investor standpoint, using a Likert scale.  In the event of non-response, a follow-up 
copy of the questionnaire was sent by email.  After both mailings had been concluded, 
our raw response was thirty-one investors, which included the great bulk of the 
leading UK investors in high-technology companies. 
[Table 1 near here] 
   Table 1 provides summary statistics on key attributes of the investors who made 
returns.  Several points are noteworthy.  First, very high levels of funding are being 
allocated, even at the small end of the market, to high technology enterprises.  The 
average minimum investment across investors was £857k and the average maximum 
investment was £4,459k.  Overall, the average investment in a high technology firm 
was £2.6m.  Typically (91%), staged financing was used in disbursing these funds, but 
lump sum payment was a common alternative (64%), where, as we shall see below, 
the willingness to take this simpler route being predicated on the information and 
control systems to which investees were subject.  We see that high technology 
investing is by no means intrinsically a science park or technopole phenomenon, with 
less than one fifth of investors (18%) specifically targeting such geographic clusters.  
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When technopoles or science parks were named, they were diverse, ranging from 
Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester to East Midlands, Merseyside in the UK, and 
from Bavaria to Boston and Bay Area, CA, outside the UK.  Finally, intangibles are 
much more likely (75%) to be valued at estimated market value, rather than at current 
replacement cost (25%), suggesting some refinement in the valuing of intangibles, and 
perhaps also a need to prove the worth of the firm (e.g. as a development company, 
creating intellectual property (Lewis and Lippitt, 2005), but with no product to 
market, as yet) to potential venture capital backers and other possible funders (e.g. 
local, regional or central governments). 
   Turning now from key results elicited by the questionnaire, we shall briefly consider 
elements of its design.  The general approach to instrument design was to create 
questions which would reveal things about investor attitudes or preferences that would 
not be available in any other way, using regular data resources. 
[Table 2 near here] 
   Table 2 indicates the three main components of the postal questionnaire: (a) 
background information on location, size and stage of investment; (b) the utility of 
reporting (Gelb and Siegel, 2000; Hand, 2002; Mueller, 2004; Schroeder and Gibson, 
1990); and (c) information systems (Wright et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 1995), 
especially as regards company valuation and its risk sensitivity (Fiet, 1995; Ruhnka 
and Young, 1991; Uher and Toakley, 1999).  Full details are given in the Appendix, 
which sets out the complete questionnaire in its original layout.  The typical question 
design elicits information on attitudes (e.g. preferred investee location, preferred 
industrial sector), utility (e.g. of scorecarding for risk appraisal), or preference (e.g. of 
method for valuing intangible assets).  In that sense, the focus of this instrument is 
also on eliciting qualitative information about patterns of investor behaviour.  By 
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scoring the responses (e.g. typically on a five point scale) they can be converted into 
quantitative data (e.g. of the type used to construct Figures 1, 2 and 3). 
 
3. Evidence 
In this section, we shall consider the substantive evidence obtained from the 
questionnaire described above, as it relates to financial reporting, risk disclosure and 
intangible assets.  Here, the main purpose is to establish the general behavioural 
features of UK investor conduct.  It will be left to Section 4 to consider how this 
behavioural evidence can be put into an inferential framework. 
 
3.1  Financial Reporting 
First, investors were asked the extent to which the standard financial accounts they 
received from potential investees, active in the high technology area, were useful in 
assessing their company’s value (see Q.2.1 in Appendix).  Scoring was from zero 
(‘completely useless’) to 4 (‘very useful’), thus creating the FinAcUse variable.  As 
the value of high technology companies is difficult to assess, given that much of their 
prospective value is tied up in intangible assets, typically based on intellectual 
property, like patents and brands, investors were asked how they assessed, managed 
and accounted for such intangible assets.  Figure 4 presents a histogram of the 
responses.  This indicates that the modal response by investors was that standard 
financial accounts were fairly useless for assessing the value of investee companies.  
The mean response was 1.4, which is only slightly better than ‘fairly useless’. 
[Figure 4 near here] 
   This finding might be indicating a potential ‘market failure’, due to the information 
asymmetry (Chen et al., 2003; Wong, 2003) arising from investors having inferior 
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access to value relevant information, compared to investees.  However, if the prime 
purpose of financial reporting is to satisfy statutory reporting requirements, 
representing, in some sense, information deemed suitable for accountability and 
exterior audit, rather than investible value calculation, then this critique has less force.  
Indeed, investors themselves appear fairly sanguine about the lack of utility of 
financial reporting for value estimation, and are inclined to focus on their own skills 
in performing their own due diligence, or in buying-in relevant third-party due 
diligence.  Looked at in this way, they regard their performing of such financial 
intermediation functions as resolving problems of information asymmetry.  Explicit 
statements made by investors, mentioned below, support this conclusion. 
 
3.2 Risk Reporting and Disclosure 
Figure 5 reports on the answers to a question about risk reporting and disclosure (see 
Q.2.10, Appendix).  A range of options had to be calibrated, in terms of investor 
agreement.  As the legend to Figure 5 indicates, this covered adequacy of financial 
accounts, need for more information, adequacy of due diligence, and risk reporting.  
Degree of agreement was calibrated from unity (complete disagreement) to five 
(complete agreement).  Taking 3.0, the central point of our scale, as indicating 
neutrality on the issue, investors were approximately neutral about ‘the information 
currently provided in financial accounts is sufficient for our purposes’ (Risk1 = 2.95) 
and ‘requiring more disclosure in published information would provide too much 
information to rivals’ (Risk3 = 3.11).  So, sufficiency of information and excessive 
disclosure are not issues.  However, there was general disagreement of views on the 
desirability of more compulsory information (Risk2 = 2.11), the supposed benefits of 
risk reporting for comparing investees (Risk5 = 2.00), and on the potential for 
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improving risk capital allocation (Risk6 = 2.00). To illustrate, one investor said “I do 
not feel standardised risk reporting would help.  It might do the opposite, as it is 
almost impossible to achieve accuracy”. Finally, it is clear that there was general 
agreement with the view that investors’ ‘own due diligence is enough to enable us to 
assess high technology investments’ (Risk4 = 4.05).  Overall, reinforcing the above 
analysis of information asymmetry, the picture emerging is of considerable 
confidence by investors in their own capabilities, and a general aversion by them to 
further regulation (including extended statutory requirements) of information 
provision.  Given the sharp behavioural picture provided by this evidence, the 
principal and, we believe, novel question we ask in the econometric part of this paper 
(section 4 below) is: what impact does behavioural attitude have on actual investment 
provision by investors? 
[Figure 5 near here] 
 
3.3 Benefit from Required Publishing of Financial Accounts 
The evidence of Figure 5 prompts the question, what particular aspects of financial 
accounts do investors think would benefit from required publishing?  We address this 
issue in Figure 6.  Responses to the question (see Q.2.9, Appendix) relate to the 
categories of financial risk (ReqFinR), people risk (ReqPeopR), technology risk 
(ReqTechR), market risk (ReqMktR) and valuation of intangible assets (ReqIntR) (see 
an example of its impact on the cost of replacing assets in the semi-conductor industry 
(Megna and Klock, 1993)).  Attitudes to the question were measured on a five point 
scale, from unity (not at all important) to five (crucial). Figure 5 displays barcharts of 
response categories against mean responses. Again, the value 3 is neutral.  Taking that 
as a benchmark value, marked with the dotted horizontal line in Figure 6, we see that 
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investors generally were of the view that it was not important to have risk disclosure 
of several attributes (notably of markets, of people, and of intangible assets) in 
financial reports.  They were neutral, on average, about there being required reporting 
on technology. 
[Figure 6 near here] 
   Thus, in terms of agency theory, investee (viz. agent) knowledge (e.g. of markets, 
people, intangibles) of an insider nature, which is a prime source of information 
asymmetry (Barkham and Ward, 1999), is not something investors want to see 
resolved by compulsory financial reporting.  Presumably, they feel that resolving this 
information asymmetry, by their own due diligence (e.g. with respect to markets, 
people and intangibles), or by third party due diligence (e.g. with respect to 
technology) is part of their financial intermediation function.  Essentially, this is part 
of their competitive advantage as allocators of risk capital, and it is this which would 
be diminished by more extensive risk reporting requirements.  This is reinforced by 
the finding (far left column, Figure 6) that the only area in which investors are likely 
to be quite well informed (viz. on the financial side) is also the sole one that they 
would rate as important to risk disclosure, in terms of more detailed publishing. 
   This view of investor conduct and behaviour is reinforced by our qualitative 
evidence.  Emphasising the relatively neutral attitudes displayed in Figure 6, one 
investor said “I have no view – the companies we invest in won’t have published any 
accounts at that time.  We sit on the Boards of all investees and so have exposure/ 
visibility of the broad range of activities, and can exert influence across that range”.  
This quote precisely characterises the monitoring and control function of the investor, 
as principal, and suggests how this function can attenuate information asymmetry.  
Another relevant investor quote is: “I seem to disagree with your basic premise.  The 
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sort of businesses we deal with are mainly concerned with market risk – they’ve 
invented the world’s best mouse-trap, now can they sell it?  I don’t see how you can 
account for that”.  This quote emphasises that investors feel that investees too would 
rather communicate market sensitive information to entrusted insiders (like the 
investor, post-contract) rather than to the wider world (including other investors) 
through more extensive financial reporting.  Indeed, the general investor aversion to 
calibration of the sort envisaged by more extensive risk reporting is perfectly captured 
in the comment: “It’s more an art than a science, and should be kept that way for 
private companies”. 
 
3. Intangible Assets 
Finally, we turn to the evidence in Figure 7.  This was generated from a question (see 
Q.2.2 in Appendix) which asked about internally developed assets (see Hand, 2002; 
Maines et al., 2003; Mueller, 2004; and the literature review of Canibano et al., 2000) 
which may have been valued by a potential investee company in a way which was less 
than transparent. Specifically, it asked of investors: for which of a set of internally 
developed intangible assets would they require a comment to provide valuation 
information.  This set included patents, franchises, licenses and so on, as listed in 
Figure 7 (Hall et al., 2005).  Responses were coded as unity if companies requested 
valuation information, and zero if it was thought that the valuation information in 
financial statements was adequate.  The bar chart of Figure 7 has bar heights based on 
average responses across investors’ mean responses, and they range from zero to 
unity. 
[Figure 7 near here] 
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   The evidence of this figure is particularly revealing.  Investors are unanimous in 
their view that financial statements do not provide adequate valuation information 
about patents, copyrights and brands, and that therefore they would ask investee 
companies specifically to provide such valuation information.  A clear majority view 
was also in favour of receiving such information about customer lists and trademarks. 
Investors were equivocal concerning franchises and quotas. 
   The interpretation of Figure 7 should be done in the light of the evidence in Figure 
5, that investors do not generally favour more information regulation, and in Figure 6, 
that investors relish information asymmetries that make their own due diligence skill 
more valuable.  This suggests that it would be wrong to interpret the data of Figure 7 
as suggesting an investor desire for more public information on key intangible assets 
like patents, copyrights and brands.  Rather, they are admitting that they would prefer 
to pursue such information, as and when needed, from investees, during the due 
diligence process, and probably post-investment as well.  Thus, at least as far as 
private (rather than public) gains and losses are concerned, the investor view is 
somewhat conservative and not likely to be a driver of change in financial reporting.
2
 
 
4. Statistical and Econometric Analysis 
This section moves from the descriptive and analytical concerns of sections 2 and 3 to 
explicit inferential methods.  It has essentially two parts.  First, it uses correlation 
analysis to investigate links between: usefulness of financial accounts and stage of 
investment and performance; technopole investment and disclosure of risk over 
various attributes (e.g. finance, markets, health & safety); and influence by investors 
on investees’ information systems (Mitchell et al., 1997; Wright and Robbie, 1996) 
and stage, sector, risk reporting etc (Reid et al., 1997; Uher and Toakley, 1999).  
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Second, it uses multiple regression analysis to examine the impact that investor 
opinion has on willingness to allocate greater or lesser volumes of funding to high 
technology firms.  Both approaches are unusual in that they focus on investor opinion 
(elsewhere, as in financial journalism, known as ‘investor sentiment’) as determinants 
(or correlates) of ‘real’ outcomes, like return on investment, or level of funds 
allocated.  The contribution of this work is therefore to make outcomes directly 
behaviourally determined, rather than indirectly determined (e.g. intermediated by 
financial structure, such as gearing) (see Brown and Cliff (2005), Fisher and Statman 
(2000), and Wong (2003), which focus on investor sentiment). 
 
4.1 Statistical Analysis 
What follows is a set of interesting correlations between behavioural variables, like 
the usefulness of financial accounts, and objective variables, like return on capital 
employed (ROCE).  The measure of association we report is the conventional 
Pearsonian product moment correlation coefficient, though the findings are similar if 
the nonparametric Spearman rank correlation coefficient is used.  Although these 
correlations are associative, rather than causal relationships, they are suggestive of 
what might be consistent with causal reasoning, and therefore lead logically to the 
more causal modelling of the following section 4.2, on econometric analysis. 
 
4.1.1 Usefulness of Financial Accounts 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients, their significance, and the sample 
size (N).  Given no a priori knowledge, two-tailed tests are reported.  The key 
variable is the usefulness of standard financial accounts (FinAcUse), as appraised by 
investors, in evaluating the value of high technology investments.  This variable 
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(which is larger, the more the usefulness) was correlated with three measures of 
potential value, Staged, ROSF and ROCE. 
[Table 3 near here] 
   Staged measures investor preference for staged (=1) over lump sum (=0) 
investments.  Thus the higher is Staged for the sample average, the greater is investor 
preference for this investment mode.  Furthermore, the lesser is the value of Staged, 
the greater is the implied value of the investee firm, because a preference for lump-
sum investing implies greater confidence that an investment will work out, without 
the precaution of the staging of financial support for it.  ROSF is, as usual, return on 
shareholders’ funds; and ROCE is return on capital employed.  Both ROSF and ROCE 
are conventional performance measures, each looking at investors’ returns in slightly 
different ways. 
   We find that Table 3 presents a consistent picture: the more useful are financial 
accounts, the better is company performance.  All three correlations are significant at 
the 5% level with, as expected, positive correlations with ROCE and ROSF, and 
negative correlations with Staged.  It may be that better run firms both perform well 
and report more usefully. Reverse causality is also possible, with more useful 
financial accounts leading to a better allocation of investible funds, and thereby better 
performance. 
 
4.1.2 Technopoles: Investment Stage and Risk Disclosure 
The correlations of Table 4 relate to a key variable, Technopole (see Q.1.2 in 
Appendix). This asks whether investors do (=1) or do not (=0) specifically target 
investments in science parks or technopoles.  About 18% of investors replied in the 
affirmative.  Our interest is in whether such an intention correlates with particular 
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sectors, stages of finance, or requirements on risk disclosure.  The results of Table 4 
are clear and revealing.  From a sectoral standpoint, only in the case of industrial 
automation (Indus07) is there significant evidence of targeting by technopole 
investors (Prob. Value = 0.008).  In terms of stage of investment, both institutional 
buyouts (Stage11) and mezzanine finance (Stage13) were significantly (positively) 
correlated with targeting technopoles (Prob. Values = 0.030 and 0.030, respectively).  
These two are amongst the less common forms of investment types, certainly not 
associated with early stage investing, and typically falling within a prudential 
investing category. 
[Table 4 near here] 
   Finally, Table 4 reports on the targeting of technopoles and requirements on risk 
disclosure in terms of hard (viz. quantitative) reporting, over the dimension of 
technology (TechFin), people (PeopFin), market (MarkFin), financial (FinQual), and 
health & safety (HnSFin).  The correlations were significant (and positive) for four 
out of five of these categories, namely technology (Prob. Value = 0.004), people 
(Prob. Value = 0.000), markets (Prob. Value = 0.044) and health & safety (Prob. 
Value = 0.004).  Although quantitative risk disclosure was not significant for finance, 
qualitative assessment (FinQual) of financial risk was significantly correlated with 
targeting technopoles (Prob. Value = 0.018). 
   The picture that emerges here is of limited special requirements for technopole 
targeting by sector and mode of finance, but a highly structured (and comprehensive) 
approach in this case to risk reporting, with an emphasis on quantitative reporting, 
except in the case of financial risk alone, for which qualitative reporting is preferred. 
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4.1.3 Influence over Internal Management 
To conclude our discussion of correlations with key variables, consider Table 5, 
which focuses on investors’ influence on investees’ internal management. The 
variable on information flow (InflInfo) is based on a question which asks how strong 
an influence investors have on investee companies’ internal information systems (see 
Q.3.1 in Appendix).  Strength of influence was calibrated from little influence (=0) to 
complete control (=5). 
[Table 5 near here] 
   It should be noted that the extent of control by investors is not generally correlated 
with industrial sector, though there is slight evidence of negative correlations with 
sectors such as media and photography (Indus12; Prob. Value = 0.037) and services 
(Indus19; Prob. Value = 0.001), which, by their nature, are sectors in which person to 
person, creative and low authority milieus prevail. 
   On stage of investment, several negative impacts of control were found, specifically 
From MBOs (Stage9; Prob. Value = 0.005), MBI (Stage10; Prob. Value = 0.025), 
LBOs (Stage12; Prob. Value = 0.048), and public to private investments (Stage14; 
Prob. Value = 0.023).  The characteristic of all these investment forms is that the 
investor has necessarily an attenuated influence, because of other persons (e.g. 
management teams) or institutions.  On the other hand, a strong positive influence (r = 
0.590; Prob. Value = 0.013) was found between extent of investor control and the use 
of quantitative risk disclosures (e.g. using sensitivity or probability analysis) as it 
relates to markets (MarkSens). 
   Turning to risk, Table 5 has two very revealing results.  First, there is a positive (r = 
0.656) and highly statistically significant (Prob. Value = 0.002) correlation between 
investor control and their confidence in their own due diligence (Risk4).  This 
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reinforces the finding of Section 3.2, on Risk Reporting and Disclosure, as it relates to 
the quantitative evidence of Figure 5 (on Risk Reporting in Financial Accounts) and 
qualitative comments like “our own due diligence is enough”.  Given a free hand, 
investors are confident in their ability to value companies.  Second, there is a negative 
(r = -0.516) and statistically significant relationship (Prob. Value = 0.024) between 
investor control and the view that standardised risk reporting facilitates the allocation 
of risk capital (Risk6).  In a sense, this is the reverse side of the coin, as regards the 
Risk4 variable on due diligence.  It too is buttressed by the evidence of Figure 5 
above, and by qualitative comments like “I do not feel standardised risk reporting 
would help.  It might do the opposite”.  The overall picture that emerges is of 
proactive, self-confident investors who, if they have good control, are able to find 
what information they require, and are not convinced that standardised financial 
accounts can meet their information needs. 
   Finally, Table 5 is insightful on the relationship between investor influence on 
investees’ information system (IS) and the exerting of control over specific features of 
internal management.  Thus there are high (and significant) positive correlations 
between investor influence on IS in general and influence on other factors like 
management accounting (InflMgt1; Prob. Value = 0.004), decision-making processes 
(InflDec; Prob. Value = 0.006), control of staff (InflStaff; Prob. Value = 0.032), 
control of management (InflMgt2; Prob. Value = 0.004) and product development 
(InflProd; Prob. Value = 0.043).  Thus, in relatively unfettered settings (e.g. free of 
the likes of MBO and MBI settings) the strength and scope of investor influence over 
the investee is considerable. 
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4.2 Econometric Analysis 
Although the evidence of 4.1 above provides insight into investor behaviour towards 
the investee in high technology settings, and provides important interpretative clues 
about the relationship between investor influence and the investee firm’s internal 
structure, it provides little guidance on cause and effect.  It may be, as we have 
indicated, that there is often a situation of mutual causality.  This is often so when 
performance is involved.  Thus better information systems can improve performance; 
and better performance allows information systems to be enhanced. 
   However, in some cases, the causal connections are more clear cut, and it is to one 
such instance that this last substantive section turns, the determination of the level of 
investment that an investor is willing to commit to a business.  Our approach is direct, 
which is only made possible by two unique features of our work: our use of new 
primary source data; and utilisation of this data in a new way.  Our view is that, 
ultimately, it is ‘investor sentiment’, or investor judgement (Luft and Shields, 2001), 
that determines the allocation of investible funds to high technology enterprises.  The 
key component to that exercise, we would argue, is judgements about risk (see 
Bhattacharyya and Leach (1999), in a capital budgeting context, and Hardman and 
Ayton (1997), in the context of qualitative risk assessment). 
   We return, therefore, to the evidence of Figure 5 (on risk reporting) to use it in a 
new explanatory framework (see Q. 2.10 in Appendix).  In Figure 5, the evidence 
related to investor opinion (on a spectrum of complete disagreement to complete 
agreement) about matters like information provision, due diligence and risk reporting.  
We will now use these underlying opinions (embodied in variables Risk1 to Risk6), 
per se, to explain the level of funds allocated to a high technology investee.  This 
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behavioural approach bypasses more traditional measures of investment intention (e.g. 
those that are financial ratio- or capital structure-based). 
   The dependent variable chosen is either an investor’s average investment (Average) 
or his minimum investment (Min) in a high technology enterprise (see Q.1.5 in 
Appendix).  The independent variables are Risk1 to Risk6.  Models 1 and 2, 
respectively, in Table 6, refer to the use of either the Average or Minimum level of 
investment made, respectively.  Essentially, the underpinning of each model is the 
control relationship: 
 Level of investment funds allocated = f(investor attitude to risk) + ε (1) 
where ε is a random error term.  The model of equation (1) is estimated by multiple 
linear regression, using least squares on our cross-section of data on investors, as 
reported in Table 6. 
[Table 6 near here] 
   We observe, first, that both models explain over fifty per cent of the variation in 
level of funds allocated (either average or minimum).  Each regression is highly 
statistically significant, with F values of 4.098 (Prob. Value = 0.018) and 4.830 (Prob. 
Value = 0.010), respectively (for k=6, n-k = 12 degrees of freedom).  Table 6 gives 
estimated coefficients, and their corresponding t-statistics and Prob. Values.  Not 
surprisingly, given the small sample size, high significance levels are hard to achieve 
for individual coefficients, given the sample size and limited degree of freedom. 
   Even so, the results are of interest.  Most reassuring, all coefficients have the same 
sign in each model, with the exception of that attaching to the variable Risk6.  Indeed, 
this variable, and that of Risk5 too must be considered insignificant, on any reasonable 
interpretation of probabilities. That is, investors’ views on risk reporting do not 
determine levels of investment.  This result is robust across the two models.  Note this 
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evidence is not inconsistent with the finding of Figure 5, that investors generally (viz. 
on average) disagree with the view that standardised risk reporting could either 
facilitate the comparison of potential investees (Risk5) or facilitate the allocation of 
risk capital (Risk6). 
   Of the other independent variables, the interpretation of Risk2 (‘more information 
should be compulsory’) and Risk4 (‘our own due diligence is enough’) are equivocal, 
given the probability levels.  Perhaps the only interpretation one could reasonably 
confidently lean upon is that minimum investment is lower (Model 2) the greater is 
the confidence in due diligence (Risk4).  This suggests that investors’ due diligence 
does not, on average, favour the investible position of UK high technology firms.  
Given the fixed costs of due diligence are considerable, this may be filtering out 
prospects of small companies. 
   Finally, we turn to the independent variables Risk 1 (‘current provision of financial 
information is adequate’) and Risk3 (‘more disclosure would provide too much 
information’).  These variables both calibrate conservative investors’ positions.  They 
are both are positively correlated with higher levels of investment, both average and 
minimum.  The strongest result related to Risk3. The finding is consistent with what 
we know of investment practice.  If investors know more about target investees than 
rival investors, and due diligence is (on average) rigorous, they will allocate higher 
levels of investible funds, both in minimum terms, and on average, over deals 
divested at such targets.  The behaviour implied by the Risk1 variable is, arguably, 
consistent with that of the Risk3 variable, as it suggests that investors who perceive 
themselves to be capable of eliciting greater deal-sensitive information from investees 
than rivals will be willing to invest more, and will not want current financial 
accounting practice to be enhanced. 
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   Overall, these results, and their interpretation, suggest the potential fruitfulness of an 
approach to explaining levels of investment by focusing on behavioural variables 
(attitudes to information, risk disclosure etc), rather than on structural variables (e.g. 
gearing, assets etc). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper aims to advance the methodology of analysing investment practice, using 
the setting of UK venture capital investing in high technology companies.  The paper 
presents a statistical and econometric analysis of questionnaire returns from the UK’s 
leading high-technology investors, focusing on financial reporting, risk, information 
and level of investment.  We find that: 
• Investors prefer to rely upon their own procedures and processes (rather than 
those of investees) when evaluating potential investments in high technology 
companies. 
• Financial accounts appear to have little to offer to investors, in terms of risk 
disclosure or the valuation of intangible assets such as intellectual property. 
• It does not seem that investors would welcome compulsory risk disclosure, as 
they judge that this is likely to provide too much information to rival investors. 
• Two alternative models provide explanations of the level of investment in high 
technology companies, using risk-based behavioural variables. 
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Notes 
                                                           
1
  See, for example, the introductory chapters to the Venture Capital Report. 
2  This view is influenced, at least in part, by the fact that many high-technology companies will still 
be in their early start-up or development phases, and may not, as of yet, have produced any 
financial accounts. 
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Accounting for Risk in UK Venture Capital Contexts 
A project sponsored by the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland 
 
 
1.  Background 
 
1.1 What geographical preferences do you have when deciding whether or not to make an 
investment?  Please rank your preferences below, from 1 to  5 (where 1 is most important, 5 is 
least important). 
 
Geographical Preference Rank (1 to 5, with 1 most important) 
Local  
Regional  
National  
International (Europe)  
International (world wide)  
 
1.1 Do you specifically target investment in science parks or technopoles?  Yes No 
 
If yes, please identify which: 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Please identify below your five preferred industrial sectors for investment, ranked from 1 to 5 
(where 1 is most important, 5 is least important). 
 
Industry Top five rank (1 most important) 
Biotechnology  
Medical/health related  
Chemicals and materials  
Energy  
Construction and building products  
Financial services  
Industrial automation  
Industrial products & services  
Manufacturing  
Transportation  
Communications  
Media and photography  
Information technology hardware  
Software and computer services  
Internet technology  
Electronics  
Leisure and entertainment  
Other consumer related  
Services  
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1.3 Please identify below your five most common stages of investment, from 1 to  5 (where 1 is 
most important). 
 
Stage of Investment Most common (from 1 to 5) 
Seed  
Start-up  
Other early stage  
Expansion  
Bridge financing  
Refinancing bank debt  
Secondary purchase/Replacement equity  
Rescue/turnaround  
Management buy-out (MBO)  
Management buy-in (MBI)  
Institutional buy-out (IBO)  
Leveraged build-up (LBU)  
Mezzanine finance  
Public to private  
Purchase of quoted shares  
 
 
1.4 What are the minimum, maximum and average size of investments you make in a year? 
 
Minimum £ 
Maximum £ 
Average £ 
 
 
1.5 Do you have a preference for lump sum or staged investments, or a combination of the two? 
[please tick relevant box below] 
 
Lump sum  
Staged investment  
Combination  
 
 
 
 
 
2.  High Technology and Financial Accounting 
 
High-technology companies are difficult to assess, because much of their value is tied up in so-called 
‘intangible assets’, such as intellectual property, brands, patents, and so on.  This section therefore 
examines the ways in which you assess, manage and account for intangible assets in high-technology 
companies. 
2.1 To what extent are the standard financial accounts you receive from potential high-technology 
investees useful in assessing their value? 
 
Completely 
Useless 
Fairly Useless Neutral Useful Very Useful 
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2.2 Certain internally developed assets may have been valued by the company in ways which are 
not transparent. 
 
In this context, for which of the following internally developed intangible assets do you ask 
investees to provide such valuation information? 
 
 [Please tick one box for each case below] 
 
 
 
Intangible Asset 
We request 
information on 
how these have 
been valued 
The financial 
statements 
provide sufficient 
information 
Not relevant 
i. Patents    
ii. Copyright    
iii. Brands    
iv. Licenses    
v. Franchises    
vi. Quotas    
vii. Customer lists    
 
2.3 To what extent is the following information you receive from potential high-technology 
investees adequate for the purposes of assessing the value of their company? 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is insufficient and 5 is 
full and complete information, please tick the relevant 
box for each item. 
Insufficient …………………… Full/complete 
 
 
 
Category  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Training      
ii. Marketing      
iii. Strategy       
iv. Development costs      
v. Concessions      
vi. Patents      
vii. Licenses      
viii. Trademarks       
ix. Goodwill       
x. Payments on account      
 
 
2.4 When assessing the value of intangible assets in high-technology companies, do you favour 
valuation at current replacement cost or at estimated market value? [tick one] 
 
We favour current replacement cost  
We favour estimated market value  
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2.5 How significant are the following costs to you, when evaluating the worth of a high-
technology investment. 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is insignificant 
and 5 is highly significant information, please tick 
the relevant box for each item. 
Insignificant ……… Highly Significant 
 
 
 
Category  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Time our own workforce spends on 
assessing the technology 
     
ii. Employment of technology 
foresight specialists 
     
iii. Use of other external consultants 
[please give examples]………………… 
 
     
  
2.6. How extensive are your requirements on disclosure of risk under the following categories? 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all and 5 is very 
extensive, please tick the relevant box for each item. 
Not at all ………………………….Very Extensive 
 
 
 
Category  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Technology      
ii. People      
iii. Market      
iv. Financial      
v. Health & Safety      
 
 
2.7. Is the risk information that you require from investees quantitative, qualitative, or both?  
[Please tick all that apply] 
  
Risk disclosure must be … [tick all that apply]  
 
Category 
Quantitative (in 
monetary terms) 
Quantitative (in % 
terms, or with 
sensitivity or 
probability 
analysis) 
Qualitative 
i. Technology    
ii. People    
iii. Market    
iv. Financial     
v. Health & 
Safety 
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2.8 Do you use score-carding methods to appraise the risk in potential investee companies?  
Yes No 
 
If yes, how important are each of the following items?  
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all important and 5 
is crucial, please tick the relevant box for each item. 
Not at all important ……………………… Crucial 
 
 
 
Category  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Technical skills      
ii. Operations      
iii. Production       
iv. Support      
v. Cost estimating      
vi. Benefit estimating      
vii. Scheduling      
viii. Management      
ix. Funding      
x. Stakeholders      
xi. Information security      
xii. Human factors      
xiii. Safety      
xiv. Other [please 
specify] 
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2.9 In your view, how important is it that the following be required in published financial 
accounts? 
 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all important and 5 
is crucial, please tick the relevant box for each item. 
Not at all important …………………….… Crucial 
 
 
 
Category  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Financial risk      
ii. People risk      
iii. Technology risk      
iv. Market risk      
v. Valuations of intangible 
assets 
     
 
 
2.10 To what extent do you agree with the following statements about risk in high-technology 
investee companies? 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is 
completely disagree and 5 is 
completely agree, please tick the 
relevant box for each item. 
Completely….…Completely 
disagree                        agree 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. The information currently provided in financial 
accounts is sufficient for our purposes 
     
ii. More information should be provided 
compulsorily 
     
iii. Requiring more disclosure in published accounts 
would provide too much information to rivals 
     
iv. Our own due diligence is enough to enable us to 
assess high-technology investments 
     
v. Standardised risk reporting would facilitate the 
comparison of potential investees 
     
vi. Standardised risk reporting would facilitate the 
allocation of risk capital 
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3.  Management Accounting and Performance 
 
3.1 How strong an influence do you have over your investee companies’ internal management, 
under the headings below? 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘little influence’ 
and 5 is ‘complete control’, please tick the 
relevant box for each item. 
Little influence………...Complete control 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Information systems      
ii. Management accounting      
iii. Financial reporting policies      
iv. Decision-making processes      
v. Control of staff      
vi. Control of management      
vii. Product development      
viii. Marketing      
 
 
3.2 On average, how often are you in contact with both low and high performing investee 
companies? [please tick relevant box for each of ‘low’ and ‘high’ performers below] 
 
Frequency of Contact Low Performers High Performers 
Several times a day   
Daily   
Weekly   
Monthly   
Quarterly   
6-monthly   
Annually   
 
3.3 How regularly do you require reports from your investee companies on each of the following 
items? 
 
 daily weekly monthly quarterly annually 
i. Information systems      
ii. Management accounts      
iii. Financial accounts      
iv. Decision-making processes      
v. Control of staff      
vi. Control of management      
vii. Product development      
viii. Marketing      
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3.4 Please use the space below to provide us with any further comments you may have on the 
problems of measuring and managing  risk in high-technology ventures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many thanks for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire.  If you are interested in 
receiving summary results from our project, in due course, please tick the box.  
 
 
 
 
Dr Julia A Smith  
Cardiff Business School 
Tel: 029 2087 6652 
 
 
 
Professor Gavin C Reid 
University of St Andrews 
Tel: 01334 462431 
 
Please return completed questionnaire to: 
 
Dr Julia A Smith 
Cardiff Business School 
Aberconway Building 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff CF10 3EU 
 
 
Office use only: ________ 
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Figure 1: Investment Preference by Technology 
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Legend of Technologies  
01 Biotechnology 
02 Medical/health related 
03 Chemicals and materials 
04 Energy 
05 Construction and building products 
06 Financial services 
07 Industrial automation 
08 Industrial products & services 
09 Manufacturing 
10 Transportation 
 
11 Communications 
12 Media and photography 
13 Information technology hardware 
14 Software and computer services 
15 Internet technology 
16 Electronics 
17 Leisure and entertainment 
18 Other consumer related 
19 Services 
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Figure 2: Investment Preference by Stage 
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Legend of Principal Investment Stages 
01 Seed 
02 Start-up 
03 Other early stage 
04 Expansion 
05 Bridge financing 
06 Refinancing bank debt 
07 Secondary purchase/Replacement equity 
08 Rescue/turnaround 
09 Management buy-out (MBO) 
10 Management buy-in (MBI) 
11 Institutional buy-out (IBO) 
12 Leveraged build-up (LBU) 
13 Mezzanine finance 
14 Public to private 
15 Purchase of quoted shares 
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Figure 3: Preferences for Investment by Market Extent 
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Figure 4: Usefulness of Financial Reports in Assessing the Value of 
High-Technology Firms 
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Figure 5: Risk Reporting in Financial Accounts 
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Risk1 The information currently provided in financial accounts is sufficient for our purposes 
Risk2 More information should be provided compulsorily 
Risk3 Requiring more disclosure in published accounts would provide too much information to 
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Risk4 Our own due diligence is enough to enable us to assess high-technology investments 
Risk5 Standardised risk reporting would facilitate the comparison of potential investees 
Risk6 Standardised risk reporting would facilitate the allocation of risk capital 
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Figure 6: Importance of Disclosure in Financial Reports 
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Figure 7: Requirement for Valuation Information 
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Variable Information is requested on the valuation of: 
Patent Patents 
Copyrig Copyright 
Brand Brands 
License Licenses 
Franch Franchises 
Quota Quotas 
CustList Customer lists 
TradMark Trademarks 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Investor Conduct 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Minimum investment (£) 5,000 10,000,000 856,818 
Maximum Investment (£) 100,000 50,000,000 4,459,091 
Average investment (£) 80,000 30,000,000 2,565,714 
    
Percentage who invest in technopoles   18% 
Percentage who invest a lump sum   64% 
Percentage who use staged finance   91% 
Percentage who value intangibles at current replacement cost 25% 
Percentage who value intangibles at estimated market value 75% 
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Table 2: Outline of Postal Questionnaire 
 
1. Background 
• Geographical preference 
• Science park investing 
• Preferred high technology sector 
• Most common investment stage 
• Size of investment 
• Preference for lump-sum vs staged investment 
 
2.  High Technology and Financial Accounting 
• Utility of standard financial accounts 
• Required valuation information on internally developed intangible assets 
• Adequacy of investee information for company valuation 
• Current replacement cost vs estimated market value of intangible assets 
• Significance of costs in evaluating investment worth 
• Extent of requirements of risk disclosure 
• Qualitative vs quantitative risk information 
• Use of score-carding for risk appraisal 
• Necessity of required elements in financial accounts 
• Degree of agreement on risk reporting and disclosure 
 
3.  Management Accounting and Performance 
• Extent of influence on firm’s internal management 
• Extent of contact with high vs low performing firms 
• Required reporting frequency in firm’s AIS 
• Problems of measuring and managing risk 
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Table 3:  Correlations with the Usefulness of Financial Accounts 
FinAcUse Staged ROSF ROCE 
Pearson Correlation -0.449
*
 0.509
*
 0.553
*
 
Prob. Value 0.041 0.044 0.028 
N 21 16 16 
*
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 4:  Correlations with Investment in Technopoles 
Techpole Indus07 Stage11 Stage13 TechFin 
Pearson Correlation 0.547
*
 0.463
*
 0.463
*
 0.494
*
 
Prob. Value 0.008 0.030 0.030 0.044 
N 22 22 22 17 
     
Techpole PeopFin MarkFin  FinQual HnSFin 
Pearson Correlation 0.789
**
 0.494
*
 0.566
*
 0.658
**
 
Prob. Value 0.000 0.044 0.018 0.004 
N 17 17 17 14 
**
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5:  Correlations with Influence over Management Accounting 
InflInfo Indus12 Indus19 Stage09 Stage10 
Pearson Correlation -0.447
*
 -0.667
**
 -0.577
**
 -0.478
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.037 0.001 0.005 0.025 
N 22 22 22 22 
     
InflInfo Stage12 Stage14 MarkSens Risk4 
Pearson Correlation -0.426
*
 -0.481
*
 0.590
*
 0.656
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.048 0.023 0.013 0.002 
N 22 22 17 19 
     
InflInfo Risk6 InflMgt1 InflDec InflStaff 
Pearson Correlation -0.516
*
 0.593
*
 0.567
**
 0.458
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.024 0.004 0.006 0.032 
N 19 22 22 22 
     
InflInfo Inflmgt2 InflProd   
Pearson Correlation 0.593
*
 0.436
*
   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.043   
N 22 22   
**
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6: Regressions explaining Levels of Investment  
   
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variables Average Investment Minimum Investment 
   
Independent Variables Coefficients t-statistic 
(Prob. 
Value) 
Coefficients t-statistic 
(Prob. 
Value) 
Risk1 1506.10
3
 1.875 
(0.085) 
5637.10
2
 2.163 
(0.051) 
Risk2 1201.10
3
 1.598 
(0.136) 
4020.10
2
 1.646 
(0.126) 
Risk3 2566.10
3
 2.635 
(0.022) 
9269.10
2
 2.932 
(0.013) 
Risk4 -2657.10
3
 -1.652 
(0.124) 
-9656.10
2
 -1.849 
(0.089) 
Risk5 4282.10
2
 0.171 
(0.867) 
6138.10
2
 0.755 
(0.465) 
Risk6 3372.10
2
 0.125 
(0.903) 
-4373.10
2
 -0.499 
(0.627) 
Constant 2952.10
3
 -0.399 
(0.697) 
-9092.10
2
 -0.378 
(0.712) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.508  0.561 
F-Statistic  4.098  4.830 
Prob. Value  0.018  0.010 
 
Variable Statement 
Risk1 The information currently provided in financial accounts is sufficient for our purposes 
Risk2 More information should be provided compulsorily 
Risk3 Requiring more disclosure in published accounts would provide too much information to 
rivals 
Risk4 Our own due diligence is enough to enable us to assess high-technology investments 
Risk5 Standardised risk reporting would facilitate the comparison of potential investees 
Risk6 Standardised risk reporting would facilitate the allocation of risk capital 
 
